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VABSTRACT
LOGICAL IMPLICATIONS AND PRESUPPOSITIONS
IN ENGLISH COMPLEMENT CONSTRUCTIONS
September 1978
Karl Dieter Gutschera, Dipl. Psych., University of
Tuebingen, Germany, M.S., University of Massachusetts
Ph.D., University of Massachusetts
Directed by Professor Charles Clifton
The question was asked whether the semantic representa-
tion of logical implications or presuppositions is the
decomposed form of the input sentence or whether the sen-
tence representation is relative close to the surface form
of the input sentence and the implication and presupposition
have to be derived from it. Experiment I-III showed the
difficulties models have which assume that a person uses the
decomposed form of a sentence in order to answer a question
about the implication or presupposition. Experiment IV and
V separated the stage of comprehending the implication and
presupposition from the decision stage by presenting the
matrix sentence (e.g. He forgot to pay his income tax)
before the probe sentence (e.g. He didn't pay his income
tax). Reaction time was measured from the onset of the
probe sentence until the subject responded. The results of
these two experiments (Experiment V differed from Experiment
vi
IV by employing imaginal instructions) showed that decision
time was influenced by the class of predicates used in the
matrix sentence (factive, implicative and negative-
implicative), by the different predicates within a class and
by whether the first sentence was explicitly negated or not.
This outcome was regarded as strong evidence that subjects
did not use a decomposed form of the input sentence when an-
swering the question. A model was proposed which assumes
that the subject computes the value of the implication or
presupposition (affirmative or negative) from the matrix
sentence at the time when he is asked to answer a question
about them.
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INTRODUCTION
.
When comprehending linguistic information, people
generally know more about a given situation then what is
directly presented to them. Consider as an example the sen-
tence: "The policeman held up his hand and stopped the
car". A person listening to this sentence easily under-
stands that there is a driver involved who steps on a brake
in response to seeing the policeman's hand. Yet nothing of
this is explicitly stated in the above sentence (Schank and
Abelson, 1977, p. 9).
Several investigators have claimed that inferential in-
formation of this type is represented together with the
original presented information in memory. (e.g. Kintsch,
197^; Thorndyke, 1976). For example, Schank and Abelson
(1977) state: "Any information in a sentence that is im-
plicit must be made explicit in the representation of the
meaning of that sentence" (p. 11). Bransford & Franks (1971)
and Bransford, Barclay & Franks (1972) argue that subjects
integrate sentences with each other and with the knowledge
of the world they possess and form a unified representation.
Potts (1972, 197^) also concludes that inferred information
is stored together with the actual information presented.
Kintsch (197^) in discussing how people comprehend
2paragraphs concludes that comprehension consists in con-
structing an abstract representation of the content of the
paragraph from whatever cues are available in a text. And
furthermore, that people, in order to construct a coherent
text base, frequently have to include propositions which are
not directly represented in the surface structure of the
text
.
However, not everybody agrees that the semantic
representation of a sentence has to include the possible in-
ferences. For example, Fodor, Fodor and Garrett (1975)
state that, "barring decisive evidence to the contrary, we
should assume that the semantic representation of a sentence
is as much like the surface form of the sentence as we can"
(p. 526). Kintsch (197M) formulates the question as follows:
"If one asks the subject to make comparisons or inferences
about presuppositions or implications, we know that subjects
must and do, indeed, analyze these expressions (see, for ex-
ample, Just & Clark, 1973, for inference experiments). But
is this because the sentence itself is stored in its decom-
posed form, or because of the application of a meaning rule
to a lexically complex expression? The Clark data can be
accounted for either way" ( pp . 222-223 )
.
While it is clear that subjects have to analyze complex
expressions at least to some degree, the evidence as to
whether inferences are stored together with the base sen-
tenoe or are derived through meaning postulates Is either
not conclusive or not available at all. Therefore, the
Question I Will try to answer is this: Are inferences ™ade
at the ti^e of initial comprehension or are they made when
trying to answer a question? And I am going to ask this
question for the limited domain of sentences containing
logical presuppositions and implications.
Part Of fully comprehending a sentence Is understanding
these presuppositions and implications. Consider the sen-
tence Mary took into accoun t that she kissed the king of
£!:anoe. Given that the whole sentence represents a true
proposition, it follows that the complement sentence Mary
iiiised the king of France also represents a true proposi-
tion. The complement sentence Mary kissed the king of Fran-
ce will be called the logical presupposition of the sentence
Mary took into account that she kissed the king of France
and Mill be distinguished from the logical implication of a
sentence. The complement sentence Mary kissed the king of
Iranoe will be referred to as the logical implication if it
is derived from a sentence of the form Mary took the oppor-
tunity to kiss the king of France
. While both presupposi-
tion and Implication refer to sentences which imply the
truth of their complements, they differ with respect to
negation. Negating the higher sentence does not change the
presupposition, • but does negate the Implication. While the
sentence Mary dldn.t take into account kissed the
iling of France still presupposes that Mary kissed the king
Of France, the sentence Mary dldnU take the opportunity to
iliH the king of France implies that Mary did not kiss the
king of France.
Of considerable interest in forming a theory of sen-
tence comprehension is the question as to how the presup-
positions and implications of sentences are stored and
processed when a person understands a sentence. In par-
ticular I will consider the following alternatives:
1. The logical presupposition or implication of a sen-
tence is extracted immediately (at comprehension
time) and stored together with the representation of
the main sentence.
2. The logical presupposition or implication is ex-
tracted when needed (at retrieval time), for ex-
ample, when asked to answer a question. A person may
use in this case the stored surface form of the sen-
tence or some more abstract representation (deep
structure)
.
Not all predicates (verbs, adjectives, nouns) in
English complement constructions carry with them the presup-
position or implication of their complement. If one
replaces the predicate take into account with the predicate
assume, the sentence Mary assumed that she kissed the king
of France or the negated version Mary didn't assume that she
kissed the king of France no longer presupposes that Mary
actually did kiss the king of France.
The class of predicates which presuppose the truth of
their complement (regardless of whether the main sentence
was affirmative or negative) was termed factives (F) as op-
posed to non-factives (NF) (Kiparsky and Kiparsky, 1971).
The Kiparskys (1971) list the following examples:
I. Subject-clauses (predicates which take sentences as their
subjects)
.
Factives ; significant, tragic, relevant, counts, suf-
fices, odd, exciting, matters, makes sense, amuses
Non-Factives : likely, possible, false, appears,
chances, sure, true, seems, happens, turns out. II.
Object-clauses (predicates which take sentences as their ob-
jects) .
Factives ; regret, grasp, take into consideration, take
into account, bear in mind, ignore, make clear, be
aware (of), comprehend, forget (about), deplore,
resent, care (about).
Non -Factives ; suppose, assert, allege, assume, claim,
charge, maintain, believe, conclude, conjecture, in-
timate, deem, fancy, figure.
That the distinction between factive and non-factive
predicates is not restricted to the semantic domain is shown
in the next two examples which demonstrate that these
predicates also behave in a different way syntactically.
(For additional examples see Kiparsky and Kiparsky, 1971).
1. The subject of the complement sentence can be raised for
non-factives into the upper sentence where it becomes the
surface object of its verb (subject raising), while this
transformation results in an ungrammatical sentence (»)
for factive predicates.
NF: He believes that Mary has kissed the king of France vs.
He believes Mary to have kissed the king of France.
F: He regrets that Mary has kissed the king of France vs.
•He regrets Mary to have kissed the king of France.
2. Placing the complement at the end of a sentence (ex-
traposition) is an optional transformation for factive
predicates, but an obligatory one for non-factives.
F: That she kissed the king of France in our kitchen made
sense to me vs.
It made sense to me that she kissed the king of France
in our kitchen.
NF: *That she kissed the king of France in our kitchen seems
to me vs.
It seems to me that she kissed the king of France in our
kitchen.
That the factive/non-factive distinction is not limited
to that-clauses was demonstrated by Karttunen (1971). He
noted that certain adjectives such as glad, proud,
also presuppose the truth of their complement. The sentence
John glad to see h^ glad to see
his parents and Was Joyui gl^ to see his parents ? all
presuppose that John saw his parents. If one replaces
however the verb glad with eager, ready or willing
,
etc., no
presupposition remains.
However, many predicates taking a to-complement izer
belong to the class of implicative verbs (Karttunen, 1971),
so called because they imply the truth of their complement.
Karttunen (1971) defines "imply" as:
P implies Q iff
whenever P is asserted
the speaker ought to believe that Q
So for example, John managed to solv e the problem im-
plies that John solved the problem, while John didn't manage
to solve the problem implies that John did not solve the
problem. Karttunen lists the following implicative and non-
implicative predicates:
Implicatives : manage, remember, bother, get, dare,
care, venture, condescend, happen, see fit, be care-
ful, have the misfortune, have the sense, take the
time, take the opportunity, take the trouble, take
it upon oneself.
8Non-irnplicati^^ agree, decide, want, hope, promise,
plan, intend, try, be likely, be eager, be ready,
have in mind.
Besides the class of implicative predicates he further
introduces the class of negative-implicatives. The name
results from the fact that verbs of this class imply the
truth of the negated complement. The predicate fail may
serve as an example: The sentence John failed to solve the
BToblem has the implication that John did not solve the
problem, while the negated sentence John didn't fail to sol-
ve the problem has the implication that John did solve the
problem. (I will disregard for my purposes the possible
reading: It wasn't that John failed to solve the problem,
he simply refused to try). Karttunen (1971) lists the fol-
lowing examples:
Negative-implicatives
: forget, fail, neglect, decline,
avoid, refrain.
It is tempting to regard the negati ve-implicative verbs
as just the negative counterparts of the implicative
predicates. In this sense forget would be equal to not
remember and fail to either not do or not succeed
. However,
positive forms don't seem to exist for the predicates
n^g^^^^ and avoid . Furthermore, the two sentences AU of
the board members forgot to come to the meeting and All of
the board members did not remember to come to the meeting do
9not necessarily have the same meaning. While the first sen-
tence can only be interpreted to mean that none of the board
members came to the meeting, the second sentence has the ad-
ditional interpretation that not all of the board members
came to the meeting. (Examples from Karttunen. 1971).
So far I have discussed some linguistic facts about
presuppositions and implications as used in English comple-
ment constructions. I showed how they behaved under negation
and how they depend on the nature of the main verb. I will
use those properties to answer my original question about
storage and retrieval of inference information after I have
outlined a recent methodological and theoretical approach to
sentence verification.
General Method
.
Recent work in psychology (Clark and Chase, 1972;
Trabasso, Rollins, & Shaughnessy, 1971) has provided us with
a paradigm and theory which can be adopted to answer the
question of whether there is immediate or delayed extraction
of presupposition and implication or not. Clark and Chase
(1972) devised a sentence-picture verification task, where
the subject is shown a sentence like Star isn't below plus
and a picture showing a star either above or below a plus
sign. The subject is instructed to read the sentence, look
at the picture and respond as quickly as possible by
10
pressing one of two buttons indicating whether the sentence
is true or false of the picture.
Let us assume the sentence is presented before the pic-
ture and that we have the true negative condition with the
sentence reading Star isn't below plus and a picture showing
a star above a plus sign. It is postulated that in a first
stage the subject encodes the sentence as falseCstar below
P^"s )
.
In a second stage, he encodes the picture as
true( plus below star) if the sentence as in our example con-
tained the word below and that he uses above if the sentence
contained the word above . In a third stage he compares the
subjects of the embedded sentences. For our example this
comparison would result in a mismatch which is supposed to
change a truth-index (originally set at "true") to "false".
As a next step the subject compares the embedding strings.
The result would be another mismatch which would set the
truth-index back to "true". The last stage is the response
stage, where the subject executes the value of the truth-
index and therefore responds "true".
One can summarize the different conditions by
specifying if the decision is either true (T) or false (F)
and if the sentence is either affirmative (A) or negative
(N). Using the true-affirmative (TA) condition as the base
line, false-affirmatives (FA) should take the additional
time i because of a mismatch of the embedded strings (inner
11
mismatch or falsification time), while false-negatives (FN)
should add the extra time o since the mismatch occurs with
the embedding strings (outer mismatch or negation time).
Finally, true-negatives (TN) should add the additional times
1^ plus o since the embedded as well as the embedding strings
mismatch
.
With the additional assumption that it takes longer to
encode the word below than to encode the word above, adding
a constant to all the conditions using the word below in the
stimulus sentence, Clark and Chase (1972, Experiment I) were
able to show that the outlined model provided a good fit to
their data. Since then the general approach has been proven
fruitful for a variety of situations (Carpenter, 1973; Car-
penter & Just, 1975; Clark & Chase, 1972, Experiment II and
III; Gough, 1966; Just, 197^; Just & Carpenter, 1971;
Trabasso, Rollins, & Shaughnessy, 1971, Experiment IX).
The Just and Clark Experiment .
Just and Clark (1973, Experiment I) asked the question
whether subjects are "able to access and make use of the
presuppositions and implications of a sentence independently
of each other" (p. 22). They presented a statement together
with a question and the subject responded by pressing one of
two buttons labeled "in" or "out". The stimulus sentences
were of the form: If John remembered to let the dog out ,
12
then Where is the dog? The predicates used were the pairs
remember-forget and tt^ugt^.thou^^ They tested for
both the implication (where is the dog?) and the presupposi-
tion (Where is the dog supposed to be?). The results showed
that forget took ^38 msec longer than remember and the ques-
tion where is the dog supposed to be? took 178 msec longer
than the question where is the dog? They argued that, given
the independence hypothesis is true, the presence of a nega-
tive component should only have an effect on the comparison
process when the implication is questioned but not the
presupposition (which does not change under negation). In
their experiment this should have shown up as an interaction
between reme|T^-forg^ and the question. However, their
results showed a nonsignificant interaction of 6? msec in
the wrong direction (F<1).
In a second experiment they used stimulus sentences of
the form: if John forgot to let the dog out, then the dog
is ijn and the subject responded by pressing a button labeled
either "true" or "false". They wanted to test the
hypothesis that the subject uses the components of the main
sentence, always checking the implication first, and only if
this fails looks at the presupposition (ordered model).
With respect to the implication of the predicates
remembered to and forgot to they obtained the following
results: TA = 28.14 msec, FA = 3252 msec, TN = 3670 msec and
13
FN
= 3536 ^seo. The re^e^.forget by true-false Interaction
was Significant (F( 1,1 1 ) = 1 3. 35 , p<.01). while the true-false
difference was not (F(1 in-i ^Q\ tw,<cvr V I , I I ;.i . 19 J , Thig outcome, they took
as support for their ordered model.
However, Just and Clark do not specify a processing
model. If we agree with Just and Clark as to what the im-
plication of a given sentence is we would get the following
representations for sentences with remember = true (out , dog)
and forget
= false(out
, dog)
. Assuming further that the last
part of the sentence then the dog is in or out is encoded as
true(in,dog) or true(out
, dog) and that the comparison-
process is as in the Clark and Chase (1972) model, then we
can derive the following predictions for the four condi-
tions: TA
= k1, FA=kUi, FN = k2.o and TN = k2.i.o. (klandk2
are the different encoding times for the predicates remember
and forget while i and o stand for the additional time an
inner or outer mismatch requires). As can be seen easily,
this model not only predicts a remember-forg^ by true-false
interaction, but in addition it predicts that the TN-FN dif-
ference should be equal to the FA-TA difference, which
clearly was not the case in their experiment.
It is not obvious that the implication of John forgot
to let the dog out is, as they state, false (out , dog ) and not
true(in,dog). The latter case is regarded by Just and Clark
as the conversion model and rejected (it predicts TN<FN).
However, without specifying the underlying processing as-'
sumptions there is little to choose between one proposed
representation over another. Therefore, in my first experi-
ment not only will I consider different underlying represen-
tations but also different control processes and their rela-
tions to each other. Furthermore, since the processes and
representations involved may depend on the time the subject
has for encoding the implication or presupposition of a sen-
tence, the order of presentation of main sentence and ques-
tion will be varied.
Plan of Investigation
.
Clark and Chase (1972) presented both the picture and
the sentence, controlling the order of processing by either
presenting the picture first (picture to the left of the
sentence) or the sentence first (sentence to the left of the
picture). Their results made it necessary to assume a dif-
ferent representation for the encoded picture, as well as
different control processes, depending on what was encoded
first, the sentence or the picture. Furthermore, the en-
coding times of both picture and sentence were part of the
measured decision times.
It seems desirable to control the amount of
preprocessing of the presupposition or implication of a sen-
tence using English complement constructions as discussed
above. I will consider two extremes:
i15
1. In a first experiment a subject sees the complement sen-
tence (e.g. He paid his tax) or the negated form (He
didn't pay his tax) before the main sentence (e.g. He
lEIgot to pay his tax) containing the complement. The
main sentence has either a presupposition or implication
which is the same as expressed in the first sentence or
contradictory to it and the subject so indicates by
responding "true" or "false". Reaction time (decision
time) is measured from the onset of the main sentence.
From previous research one might expect sentences con-
taining an explicit negative to be verified more slowly
than affirmative sentences (Clark & Chase, 1972; Trabas-
so, Rollins, & Shaughnessy, 1971; Wason, 1961) and sen-
tences containing an implicit negative predicate more
slowly than sentences with implicit affirmative
predicates (Clark, 1971; Just 4 Carpenter, 1971; Just and
Clark, 1973).
2. In a second experiment a situation is created where the
subject has time to extract the correct presupposition or
implication of a given sentence. This is achieved by
presenting the main sentence first (e.g. He forgot to
pay his tax ) and following it either by the affirmative
complement sentence (He paid his tax ) or the negative one
(He didn 't pay his tax). As in Experiment I, the subject
indicates if- the complement sentence reflects the correct
I
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presupposition or implication of the main sentence.
However, decision time is now defined as the time from
the onset of the complement sentence until the subject
responds
.
Given the hypothesis that a person stores the
presupposition or implication of a sentence separately
from its assertion one no longer expects main effects of
verbs, verb class, polarity of the main sentence, or in-
teractions of these factors. These parameters should be
reflected only in the encoding time (inspection time) of
the first sentence.
Given the alternative hypothesis that a person ex-
tracts the presupposition or implication at time of
retrieval, these factors, however, should still influence
decision time.
EXPERIMENT I
Method
.
.
Subjects. The subjects were 10 paid students from the
University of Massachusetts who participated in three con-
secutive daily sessions of approximately one hour each.
They received $2 per session.
Apparatus
.
The experiment was controlled by a digital
computer. Subjects were seated behind a table and had a
display scope and response panel in front of them. The
response panel consisted of ^ response buttons, one for the
inspection time, two for the "true-false" decision time and
one for restarting the trial sequence after the occurrence
of an error and for starting the next block of trials.
^^^"""^"s material
. The main sentences used in the ex-
periment were of the form: NP-VP-(NP-complement ) . The sub-
ject of the sentence was always He. Three different
VP-classes according to the classification of Karttunen
(1972) were used: Factives, implicatives and negative-
implicatives. Each verb class contained four different
verbs. The four factive predicates were: forgot
, remem-
bered, was happy, was sorry which were combined with a that-
complementizer
.
The implicative predicates used were remem-
bered, condescended
,
managed and happened and were combined
with a to-complementizer. Forgot
,
refused
, declined and
17
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ililiected made up the class of negative-implicative
predicates using a to-complementizer also. Notice that the
verb remember with a to-complementizer belongs to the class
of implicatives. the verb forget to the class of negative-
implicatives, while both verbs become factives when used
with a that-complementizer
.
The factive predicates was happy and was sorry may also
be classified as emotives, a distinction used by the Kipar-
skys which cuts orthogonally across the concept of fac-
tivity. Furthermore, the factive predicates remembered that
and was happy can be regarded as inherently positive
predicates, while forgot that and was sorry have a negative
connotation
.
Four different NP-complements were used and were ran-
domly assigned to a given condition on a given trial, with
the restriction that on two successive trials the same
complement could not occur. The four complements were: He
P^^^ fUs tax, he ate his dinner
, he wrote his mother and he
^^^^ work
.
On a given trial the complement of the main
sentence was used in either its affirmative or negative form
as the first sentence.
Half of the stimulus sentences required a positive
response and half a negative. All in all, there were 48
conditions: three verb classes, with four predicates in
each, the first sentence either explicitly affirmative or
19
negative and the second sentence either explicitly affirma-
tive or negative. It took two blocks of 24 trials each to
show all the conditions to a subject.
I will denote the required decision as either true (T)
or false (F), the extracted presupposition as always affir-
mative (A) since it does not depend on the polarity of the
main sentence and the implication as either affirmative (A)
or negative (N). For factive predicates we obtain two TA
and two FA conditions, in each case one originating from an
affirmative main sentence and one from a negative one. For
implicative and negative-implicative predicates we obtain
four different conditions: TA, FA, FN and TN. Let us con-
sider as an example a TN condition involving the implicative
verb remember. The subject would see as his first sentence
the complement sentence He didn 't pay his tax, followed by
the second sentence (the main sentence) He didn't remember
to pay his tax. The implication of the main sentence is
that he did not pay his tax which is congruent with the
first sentence and therefore the subject responds "true".
Procedure
. Each trial started with a 2 sec blank
period, after which the sentences were displayed succes-
sively, each one on a single line with each letter taking up
about .2 cm per space. The first sentence the subject saw
was the complement sentence, either in an affirmative or
negative form.. The subject was instructed to read the sen-
20
tenoe and to press
. button with his left Index finger as
soon as he comprehended the sentence. Immediately after the
subject's response, the complement sentence was taken off
the screen and after a 200 msec delay the main sentence was
presented. The subject's task was to judge if the first
sentence reflected the correct presupposition or implication
of the second sentence by answering either "true" or "false"
using the index and middle finger of his right hand. Finger
assignment of the right hand was balanced over subjects.
The necessity of responding as fast as possible without
making mistakes was emphasized.
On a given day. a subject received 10 blocks of 2H
trials each, with a brief rest period after each block. At
the end of each block the subject received information about
his mean reaction time and about the total numbers of errors
he made. On the first day the subject was familiarized with
the stimulus material. He received on a sheet of paper a
list of all possible stimulus sentences, together with a
complement sentence and he indicated whether the complement
sentence was the correct presupposition/implication of the
main sentence or contradictory to it by either marking
"true" or "false". Errors were few in this preliminary task
and the subjects agreed with the experimenter's interpreta-
tion of the sentences. At the beginning of the actual ex-
periment the subjects received one block of 2H practice
21
trials, randomly chosen fro. the .8 oondUlons. On days two
three the suh,e=t received 8 war...p trials at the
beginning of the session instead of the 2. practice trials
Results
Analyses of variances were performed for both the in-
spection and the decision ti^es: one ana^sis involving
factive verbs with subjects (S). days (D), verbs (V).
.ain
"ntence affirmative or explicitly negative (S2,, and
complement sentence affirmative or explicitly negative (SI)
factors, and one involving implicative and negative-
i^plicative verbs with subjects (S). days (D), class of
verbs (C=either implicative or negatlve-implicative)
, verbs
Within a Class (V/C), main sentence affirmative or ex-
plicitly negative (S2) and complement sentence affirmative
or explicitly negative (SI) as factors. All factors with
the exception of subjects were considered fixed effect
variables.
Inspection Times
.
Subjects inspected the first sentence an average of
1630 msec per trial on day 1, 1201 msec on day 2 and 950
msec on day 3. Complement sentences which contained an ex-
plicit negative were viewed 185 msec longer than affirmative
sentences for conditions involving "factive predicates"
22
(F(1,9)
= 87.6, MSe = il6.880) and 197 msec longer for conditions
involving
"negative-implicati ve" predicates (F( 1 ,9)=58. 1
,
MSe=160,090)
.
Decision Times
.
The mean decision times for each condition as well as
the average over verbs for each verb class are shown in
Table 1.
Table 1 about here
The standard errors estimated from the error terms of
the S1»S2»V and S1»S2»V/C interactions were 27 msec and 33
msec for the conditions involving factive verbs and
implicative/negative-implicative verbs respectively.
^^Qss of factive verbs
. Negation of the first and
second sentence affected decision time. The true-false dif-
ference for factive verbs is reflected in the SI main ef-
fect. If the first sentence (the complement sentence) was
explicitly negative, decisions took 202 msec longer than
when affirmative. (F( 1 , 9 ) = 1 2. 6 1 , p<.01, MSe=386 , 443 ) . This
difference did not change over days.
Mean reaction time for explicitly negative second sen-
tences was 164 msec slower than for affirmative sentences.
(F( 1 ,9)=61 .21 , p<.01, MSe=52,957). This difference of 258
msec on day 1 dropped to 124 msec on day 2 and to 111 msec
on day 3. ( F(2 , 1 8 ) =9 . 94
,
p<.01, MSe=26,428).
TABLE 1
Decision Times For Experiment I
S2 Sentence
forgot was sorry remembered was happy FACTIVES
aff neg aff neg aff neg aff neg aff neg
SI
aff
neg
1439 1354
1476 1618
1193 1204
1385 1420
1014 1475
1260 1589
997 1254
1315 1479
1161 1322
1359 1527
remembered condescended managed happened IMPLIC.
SI
aff
neg
944 1403
1152 1601
1085 1541
1294 1522
886 1322
1092 1293
904 1261
1121 1309
955 1382
1165 1431
forgot refused declined neglected NEG-IMPL.
81
aff
neg
1137 1346
1366 1504
1067 1333
1197 1383
1096 1425
1244 1530
1094 1360
1158 1360
1092 1366
1241 1441
\
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The verb factor was also highly significant
(F(3,27)=13.24. p<.oi. MSe=75,872). Decisions concerning
implicitly negative verbs took an average of 89 msec longer
(forgot that
= 1472 msec, was sorry that = I301
.sec) than
their respective positive counterparts (remember that = 1334
msec, was happy that = 1261 msec).
Both the polarity of the first and second sentences in-
teracted with the verb factor: the 52^ interation was sig-
nificant (F(3,27)=13.79, p<.01, MSe=68,021), as well as the
S1»V interaction (F(3,27)=3.47, p<.05, MSe=23,073). The
triple interaction S1»S2*V was also significant:
F(3.27)=9.08, p<.01, MSe=21.588. The S2*V interaction was
due to the fact that sentences containing the implicitly
negative verbs forget that and was sorry that showed a small
difference between explicitly negative and affirmative main
sentences (29 msec and 23 msec respectively), while this
difference was large for sentences containing the implicitly
positive verbs remember that and was happy that (395 msec
and 211 msec respectively). A similar, but much less marked
pattern resulted in the S1«V interaction: the difference in
decision time to negative vs. affirmative first sentences
was larger for conditions with implicitly affirmative
predicates than implicitly negative predicates (181 msec vs.
150 msec for remember and forget and 271 msec vs. 204 msec
for was happy and was sorry).
25
Class of implicati^/neg^^ implicat ive verbs. If
the first sentence was explicitly negative decisions took
120 msec longer than when affirmative (F(
1 , 9 ) = 1 M . 05
,
p<.oi,
MSe = 2i|6,339).
Negation of the second sentence also had a large effect
on mean reaction time: explicitly negative main sentences
increased reaction time by 291 msec (F( 1 ,9)=55.79, p<.01,
MSe
=
36i|,530). Negating the second sentence had a bigger ef-
fect on decision time when the first sentence was affirma-
tive (3M7 msec) than when negative (235 msc), resulting in a
significant S1»S2 interaction (F( 1
, 9 ) = 6 . i| 1
, p<.05,
MSe=117,909).
Decisions about negative-implicative verbs took 55 msec
longer than about implicative verbs (F ( 1 , 9 ) =8 . 53 , p<.05,
MSe=83,162). The verbs within a class differed from each
other (F(6,5^i) = 1K31, p<.01, MSe = 70,775): the implicative
verbs remembered to (1275 msec) and condescended to (1361
msec; some subjects were not very familiar with this verb),
were more difficult to process than managed to (11^8 msec)
and happened to (1149 msec). The negative-implicative verbs
forgo t to (1339 msec) and declined (1324 msec) took longer
than refused (1245 msec) or neglected (1243 msec).
Other significant factors involving the two verb
classes were the S2»V/C interaction (F( 6 , 54 ) =2. 86 , p<.05,
MSe=47,404), and the D»V/C interaction (F( 12, 1 18)=2.56,
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P<.01, MSe=30,^52). Over days, the average reaction time
decreased from 12*92 msec to 1233 msec to 1057 msec
(F(2,18)=^6.22, p<.Oi, MSe=331,783).
Decision Errors
.
The overall error rate was 6.9J. Sentences involving
factive verbs produced 7.n errors, implicative verbs 5.7%
and negative-implicative verbs 7.9J. Errors were about
twice as frequent for conditions involving an explicitly
negative first sentence. (9.^ vs. i».7% for factives, 8.2%
vs. 3.2X for implicatives and 10.2% vs. 5.5% for negative-
implicatives). Conditions, where the first and second sen-
tence were explicitly negative showed the highest error rate
(11% for factive and negative-implicatives, 12.3% for im-
plicatives)
.
Discussion
To describe the data a processing model in the tradi-
tion of Clark and Chase (1972) is presented and after it is
shown that it fails, alternatives are considered. To sim-
plify the discussion, only conditions involving implicative
and negative-implicative predicates are considered; sen-
tences with factive predicates are discussed later on.
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^?£^i5^!li5tion Of first and second sentence.
It is assumed that sentences are encoded m
propositlonal for. (Anderson and Bower, 1973; Clark. 1969
197^; Clark and Chase. 1972; Kintsch.
,97.) and that the
representation of the affirmative or negative complement
sentence (the first sentence, is either true(he paid his
t^) or false(he paid his tax).
Furthermore, it is assumed that a person when reading
the second sentence extracts its implication and represents
it too as either true(he paid his tax, or false(he paid his
tax, before entering the comparison stage. The time to
derive at the implication depends on whether the second sen-
tence was explicitly affirmative or negative and on whether
the predicate belonged to the class of implicative or
negatlve-implioatlve predicates.
Comparison process and response stage
.
Mo^el lA. As m the Clark and Chase (1972, model the
assumption is made that the internal representations of the
first sentence and the encoded implication of the second
sentence are being compared for identity ("principle of
congruence", Clark 1969) and that in case of a mismatch an
additional operation is required. Since the Inner strings
for the two representations are always congruent, only the
comparison of the outer strings is logically necessary. If
28
a
.is.atch occurs between the outer strings it is assumed
that a truth index, originally set to "true", is changed to
"false" and passed on to the response stage. During the
response stage the value of the truth index is executed.
The model as outlined is presented in Figure 1
Figure 1 about here
and the prediction it makes are shown in Table 2 (Model lA).
Table 2 about here.
From the conditions involving implicative and negative-
Implicative predicates, it is possible to derive two in-
dependent estimates each for the n and o parameters of the
model
.
The n parameter is estimated from sentences containing
implicative predicates as 220 msec (FN-FA) and ^176 msec
(TN-TA), and as 349 msec (FA-FN) and 125 msec (TA-TN) from
sentences containing negative-impl icati ve predicates.
The estimated values of the o parameter are 207 msec
(FA-TA) and
-49 msec (FN-TN) from conditions with implica-
tive predicates and
-149 msec (FN-TN) and 75 msec (FA-TA)
from conditions with negative-implicative predicates.
Since the 95% confidence intervals can be estimated as
'»-92 msec, the notion that these comparisons reflect the same
parameters can be rejected. Furthermore, the model does not
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predict a S1 „,ain effect, which was significant at the .01
level.
Alternative Mo dels
.
Why does the previous model fail? The theory of sen-
tence verification distinguishes at least three separate
stages (encoding, comparison and response stage) and the as-
sumptions underlying each one of them could have been
violated in the present task. For example, it was assumed
that the implication for both the sentences He didn't remem-
ber to pay his tax and He forgot to pay his tax is It is
false that he paid his tax and is encoded as falseChe paid
his tax). However, as suggested earlier, forgot may not be
equal to not remember and this may be reflected in the en-
coded implication. The implication of the sentence He
didn't remember to pay hi_s tax might take the form It
false that it is true that he paid his tax and be internally
represented as false (true(he paid his tax)), while the sen-
tence He forgot to pay his tax might lead to It is true that
it is false that he paid his tax and is represented as
true( falseChe paid his tax)).
Second, the processes during the comparison stage may
be different from the ones assumed and third, the response
stage might be more complex than assumed. One major dif-
ference between our task and the sentence-picture verifica-
32
tion task is the separation in time between the two elements
(SI and S2) which are to be compared. It is conceivable that
this change in procedure could have changed the response
bias of the subject. In the Clark and Chase model a posi-
tive response bias is assumed, which is reflected in the
original setting of the truth index to "true". In our task
however, the encoding of the first sentence might have in-
fluenced the response bias of the subject, resulting in
setting the truth index originally as either positive or
negative, depending on whether the first sentence was either
explicitly affirmative or negative.
Furthermore, it is conceivable that the encoding and
comparison stages are not two separate stages, that the sub-
ject does not derive the implication of the second sentence
before comparing it to the first sentence, but rather that
he computes the right answer from the surface structure of
the second sentence. I will consider next some of these al-
ternatives in order to restrict the range of plausible
theories
.
For comparing different models with each other, a
statistic is needed which gives a value of the goodness of
fit of a given model to the data. The root mean square
deviation (RMSD) is such a statistic. However, this measure
does not take into account the different degrees of freedom
associated with each possible model. Therefore a form of r^
suggested by Reed (e.g. 1976) will be used too.
33
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where x- are the m empirical measurements of the depen-
dent variable, and are the corresponding model predic
tions using the k fitted parameters.
Model IB. As a first alternative consider an internal
representation which preserves the affirmative-negative
characteristics (implicitly or explicitly) of the sentence
components. The sentence He didn't forget to pay his tax is
now assumed to be internally represented as false (false (he
paid his tax)). The first sentence is assumed to be encoded
as either true(true(he paid his tax)) when affirmative, or
as false(true(he paid his tax )) when negative
. The truth
index is assumed to be set at "true" originally. The
predictions can be derived by using the flowchart of Figure
1 and are shown in Table 2, Model IB.
The model fails in several ways. For example, it cannot
predict the observed SI main effect.
Model IC. Adding the assumption that encoding the
first sentence determines the original setting of the truth
index leads to the next model. However, in order to arrive
at the correct decision outcomes it has to be assumed that
the internal representation of the first sentence is again
either true(he paid his tax) or false(he paid his tax) and
3^
that both inner and outer string of the internal representa-
tion of the second sentence are compared against the outer
string of the first sentence. Consider the case where the
first sentence presented is He paid his tax. The subject
encodes the sentence as true(he paid his tax) and sets his
original truth index accordingly. Assume further that the
main sentence presented is He didn't forget to pay his tax,
Which the subject encodes as false (false (he paid his tax)).
This adds time n for the explicit negation (didn't) and time
o( for the implicit negation (forget) to the encoding time.
The subject then compares the inner string of the second
sentence (false) to the value of the first sentence (true).
He obtains a mismatch and therefore changes the truth index
from "true" to "false" which adds time i to the comparison
stage. Next he compares the outer string of the second sen-
tence (false) to the value of the first sentence (true)
which again results in a mismatch and in a change of the
truth index (now from "false" to "true"), adding time o to
the comparison process. The predictions are shown in Table
2, Model IC. The flowchart is still that of Figure 1.
Although the model can predict the mean reaction times
for the four conditions involving implicative predicates, it
does badly for the conditions involving negative-implicative
predicates. The model as outlined would predict no overall
SI main effect, .but a C»S1 interaction instead, which is
contrary to tHe ottainea
.ata. CCS,: po 9,-
,aMSe=79,7il9). m,?) .28,
I£. The models outlined so far all =
the subject first f„ ' ''''
^
t . orms an internal representation of thelogical implication h«r«
Of the / """^^'"^ that
3S le.\7 "^^^ ' ''"-^ ---- "ems-.le. the suhjeot.
„hile readin. the second sentence
— es that its components are either affirmative o;negative, changing the truth index each .
negative part He th
—ters a
,
"
'•^^'i"-^ the truth value Of thefirst sentence and if it-
the ' Changescurrent value of the truth i h
,
The final value ofthe truth index is then executed Th» h ,
p.,, ,
o . e model is outlined inFigure 2.
Figure 2 about here.
Now the parameters n.and
. reflect two distinct opera-Uons each: the extra time for reading and encoding nega-tive sentence parts fevnu^fn(explicitly or implicitly) and the per-
^-ing Of a mental operation. The predictions the model
-"-es as wen as the differences between observed and
predicted mean reaction times (least s.uare criterion, are
shown in Table 2, Model ID.
Although the model is capable of predicting the correct
ordering of the mean reaction times for the different condi-
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tions (it correctly predicts the SI, S2 and C main-effects,
but does not Predict the obtained STS2 interaction), the
RMSD is still quite large (U2 msec). The model which re-
quires only M parameters has a computed r^ =
.89.
Model IE. So far I have shown that models which assume
that in a first stage the implication of the sentence is
derived and encoded before the comparison stage is entered
cannot account for the obtained data, while the last model,
which assumes that the subject operates directly on the main
sentence, can at least predict the correct ordering of the
different conditions. But is it therefore possible to con-
clude that in the present experiment subjects do not first
derive the implication?
In discussing the first model it was assumed that the
response stage consisted of executing the value of the
derived truth index. However, this may have been an over-
simplification. How easy it is to execute the response may
depend on whether the extracted implication is consistent
with the response to be executed. By adding an incom-
patibility parameter I to the conditions where the truth
value of the implication is incongruent with the response to
be executed, one can derive Model IE, Table 3, whose flow-
chart is given in Figure 3.
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Figure 3 about here.
By fitting the model only to the data of the four con-
ditions involving implicative predicates one obtains a per-
fect fit, but the same parameter values do not do as well in
fitting the conditions involving negative implicative
predicates
.
The case where the model fails involves the two condi-
tions where the first sentence is explicitly negative and
the predicate of the second sentence implicitly negative.
It is possible that under these conditions the subject
sometimes receded the predicate of the second sentence
before entering the comparison stage ( forget into not remem-
ber and didn't forget into remember ). This would increase
the predicted reaction time for the condition involving for-
get and decrease the predicted reaction time for didn't for-
get, thereby resulting in a better overall fit. (e.g. Wason
1961, who found evidence for recoding of explicit negatives.
His subjects reported to convert expressions like Six i£ not
odd into Six is even )
.
The revised model can on the surface also account for
the overall data involving factive predicates, if one allows
the n parameter to take on a smaller value. The n parameter
reflects the extra reading and encoding time for explicit
negative second sentences. The negative version of remember
X
o
m
i\0
that and forget that is didn't ren^ernber that and didn't for-
get that, While the negative of was glad that and was "sorry
that is v^'t glad tl^t and v^.t sorr^ Presumably
the reading and encoding time of negatives might be larger
for the first pair of sentences than for the second. This
would result in a lower n value when averaged over all four
predicates as compared to sentences with implicative and
negative-implicative predicates where negation is always
formed with to do. The observed and predicted data for fac
tive predicates are shown in Table 3.
Table 3 about here.
However, the data did not confirm this. While it is
true that the negation time of remember that (395 msec) is
much larger than the negation time of was happy that (211
msec), it is about the same for the two implicitly negative
verbs forget that and was sorry that (29 msec and 23 msec
respectively)
.
In developing the last model several ad hoc assumptions
were made in order to obtain a reasonable fit to the data.
Especially the introduction of the incompatibility factor I
requires further justification. There is evidence from the
comparative judgement literature (e.g. Marks, 1972) that
when the stimulus and the judgement to be made are com-
patible, subjects respond faster than when not. For ex-
TABLE 3
Observed and Predicted Decision Times for
Factive Predicates, Mode IE, Experiment I
SI S2 D I MODEL RTobs RTpred D
A F+ T A RT=K3 1161 1157 4
A F- T A RT=K2+N' 1322 1321 1
N F+ F A 1359 136A -5
N F- F A RT=K2+N'-KH-I 1527 1528 -1
K^" 1157
N'= 164
0 = 79
1 = 128
M-l
i\2
ample. subjects discriminate more rapidly between preferred
colors When asked to chose the more pleasant color. On the
other hand discriminations are more rapid between un-
preferred colors when the task is to choose the less
pleasant color (Shipley, Coffin, and Hadsell, 19^5; Shipley,
Norris, and Roberts, 19^6). In the linguistic realm Clark
(1969) demonstrated that solutions to two- and three-term
series problems take less time when the information to be
searched and the question to be answered are congruent in
their base strings than when they are incongruent.
The next two experiments attempted to measure the
presence of an I-factor directly. The prepositional forms
presumably being compared under Model IE were made external
to the subject. It was assumed that these forms are very
close to the surface forms of complement sentences or to
simple sentences in general. Therefore, only simple sen-
tences were presented to the subjects for identity judge-
ments. The two successively presented complement sentences
could either be both affirmative (AA), both negative (NN),
or one of them affirmative and the other negative (AN or
NA). The subject responded "yes" when both sentences had
the same form, but "no" when they did not. If an incom-
patibility factor is operating under these conditions than
mean reaction time should be faster when the response is
congruent with the polarity of the second sentence (AA and
13
AN conditions) than when not (NN and NA conditions), which
"ill Show up in the experiment as a SI polarity effect.
V
EXPERIMENT II
Method
.
Subjects. The subjects were 10 paid students, who had
not participated in the first experiment.
Apparatus. The experimental setup was the same as in
Experiment I; however, a response panel with only two
response buttons was used.
Procedure. Each trial started with a 2 sec. blank in-
terval, followed by the stimulus sentence. The subject saw
one of the four complements used in Experiment I, either as
an affirmative or as an explicitly negative sentence. The
sentence stayed on the screen for 2 sec. After a 250 msec
delay interval, the probe sentence appeared on the screen
and stayed there until the subject responded. The probe
sentence was the same complement as the stimulus sentence,
either in its affirmative or negative form. The subject
responded "yes»' if the stimulus and probe sentence were
either both affirmative (AA) or both negative (NN) and "no"
if one of them was affirmative and the other negative (AN,
NA).
Results
Reaction Times. The overall reaction times for the
four different conditions were as follows: AA=553 msec.
114
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AN=576 msec, NN=647 msec and NA= 710 msec. An analysis of
variance was performed with SI (first sentence affirmative
or negative), S2 (second sentence affirmative or negative),
C (the four different complements of Experiment I) and S
(subjects) as factors. The main effect of negation on the
first sentence ((AA+AN) vs. (NA+NN)) was significant, affir-
mative sentences were 1 IM msec faster than negatives
(F(1,9)=66.6, p<.01, MSe=7,808). However, with respect to
the second sentence ((AA+NA) vs. (AN+NN)), decisions about
explicitly negative sentences were 20 msec faster than about
affirmative sentences (F(1,9)=3.8, p<.10, MSe=4,114). Given
that the first sentence was affirmative, "yes" decisions
were 23 msec faster than "no" decisions. When the first
sentence was negative "no" decisions were faster than "yes"
decisions (63 msec). This resulted in a significant S1»S2
interaction (F(1,9)=7.7, p<.05, MSe=9,636). TheC-factor
and all the interactions involving C were not significant.
Discussion
The response bias part of model IE predicted that the
average of the NA+NN condition should exceed the average of
the AA+AN condition by the value of the I^ parameter. The
obtained value is 114 msec, close to the value of 128 msec
estimated in Experiment I,
il6
However, decisions on negative second sentences were
actually faster than on affirmative second sentences, which
leads one to believe that subjects might have used special
strategies which were not operating in Experiment I. One
weakness in the design of Experiment II was the way the sen-
tences were displayed on the screen. Both sentences were
displayed at the same physical location on the video screen.
This may have resulted in subjects not actually encoding and
comparing the two sentences but in using some kind of per-
ceptual strategy instead.
Therefore, Experiment II was repeated and two changes
were made: First, the second sentence was displaced towards
the right hand corner of the video display away from the
first sentence (2 cm to the right and 1.5 cm down) and
second, the inter-stimulus interval was lengthened (from 250
msec to 550 msec).
EXPERIMENT III
Method
.
Subjects. The subjects were 8 paid students, who had
nof participated in any of the other experiments.
Apparatus. The same experimental setup as in Experi-
ment II was used.
Procedure. The procedure was the same as in Experiment
II with two exceptions. The delay interval between offset
of the first sentence and onset of the second sentence was
lengthened to 550 msec and furthermore the second sentence
was displayed 2 cm to the right and 1.5 cm down with respect
to the first sentence.
Results
Reaction Times
. Although the overall reaction times
were faster, the order of the reaction times for the dif-
ferent conditions was the same as before: AA<AN<NN<NA.
The mean reaction times for the different conditions
were as follows: AA = 530 msec, AN r 533 msec, NN = 553
msec and NA = 596 msec. The analysis of variance showed a
main effect of negation of the first sentence: affirmative
sentences were ^3 msec faster than negative ones.
(F(1,7) = 13.1, p<.01, MSe = '4,il34). However, as in Experiment
II, decisions on negative second sentences were 20 msec
^7
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faster than on affirmative sentences. This difference again
was only marginally significant (F( 1 ,7)=i|.6, p-.075,
MSe=2,885). As in Experiment II "no" decisions were faster
(MBmsec) than "yes" decisions given the first sentence was
negative. However, given the first sentence was affirma-
tive, "yes"and "no" decisions did not differ from each
other. The S1»S2 interaction did not approach significance
(F(1,7)=1.8, p-.20, MSe=9,038) and neither did the C-factor
or any of the interactions involving C.
The results of Experiment III were qualitatively quite
similar to those of Experiment II. However, the size of the
estimated I parameter dropped from 11M msec in the last ex-
periment to 43 msec, while decisions on negative second sen-
tences were again 20 msec faster than on affirmative sen-
tences.
Although the combined results of Experiment II and III
(instability of the size of the 1 parameter, decisions on
negative sentences faster than on affirmative sentences) do
not exclude the possibility of an incompatibility factor,
they do not seem strong enough to justify by themselves the
introduction of additional response bias into Model IE, in
M9
order to explain the data of Experiment I.
Discussion
.
Just and Clark's (1973) experiments did not answer con-
clusively what exact representations people are using and
how they arrive at them when trying to answer a question
about the implication or presupposition of a sentence. In
discussing the results of Experiment I several underlying
representations were proposed and several processing models
considered. Although the results were not conclusive, they
did point in a certain direction. Simple models, which as-
sume that a person first extracts the presupposition or im-
plication and then compares the result to the complement
sentence (MODEL lA
,
IB, IC), proved to be inadequate. A
computation model (Model ID) needing only H parameters,
which assumed that the subject operates directly on the af-
firmative or negative components of the main sentence, did
at least as well.
However, as outlined in part two of my Plan of In-
vestigation it seems possible to address the original ques-
tion in a different way. If the implication and presupposi-
tion is indeed extracted at initial comprehension, then
decision times to subsequent probe sentences should no
longer show differences due to main verb, class of verb etc.
If the implication or presupposition is not extracted during
50
ocprehension. It is still conceivable that a person does so
just prior to the comparison stage, but it see.s
.ore li.ely
that he uses other mechanisms in order to arrive at the
right decision. The next experiment presents the main sen-
tence first, followed by the probe sentence.
EXPERIMENT IV
Method
Subjects. Eight students, none of whom participated in
any of the earlier experiments, served as paid subjects for
3 daily sessions.
Design and Procedure
. The design and procedure of Ex-
periment IV were identical to those of Experiment I.
However, instead of presenting the complement sentence first
and the main sentence second, the order of presentation was
reversed. On a given trial a subject may first see the sen-
tence He didn't forget to pay his tax followed by the
complement sentence He didn't pay his tax, which would re-
quire the response "false" of the subject. As in Experi-
ment I, inspection time for the first sentence and decision
time for the second sentence were recorded.
Results
Inspection Times
.
The mean inspection times for each condition are shown
in Table
Table ^ about here
Class of factive verbs . The implicitly negative verbs
forgot that and was sorry that were inspected 125 msec
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TABLE A
Inspection Times For Each Sentence For Experiment IV
SI Sentence
forgot was sorry remembered was happy
aff neg aff neg aff neg
1562 1780 1602 1717 1489 1540 1465 1674
FACTIVES
aff neg aff neg
1529 1678
remembered condescended managed happened
1428 1744 1483 1834 1325 1753 1430 1642
IMPLIC.
1417 1743
forgot refused declined neglected
1431 1788 1374 1794 1451 1775 1445 1825
NEG-IMPL.
1425 1796
51
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longer than the implicitly affirmative verbs remembered that
and was happy that. although the overall verb factor was
only marginally significant (F(3,21 )=2.95. p-.06,
MSe=183,M67).
If the main sentence was explicitly negative it was
viewed m9 msec longer than when affirmative (1678 msec vs.
1529 msec, F( 1 ,7) = i|.il9. p-.08, MSe = M7M
, 299 )
.
Overall an average time of 1603 msec was spent to ex-
amine sentences containing factive predicates. The inspec-
tion time diminished from 1884 msec on day 1 to ^^eo msec on
day 2 and stayed on that level on day 3 (F( 2 , 1 i|) = 1 3 . 95
,
p<.01, MSe = 5il3,672).
C]^ass of implicative and negative- implicative verbs.
Negative-implicative verbs were studied 30 msec longer than
implicative verbs (1610 msec vs. 1580 msec, F( 1 ,7)=12.07,
p<.05, MSe = U,754). However, the different verbs within
each class did not differ from each other (F( 6 , 42) r 1 . 9H
,
p-.10, MSe=91,878).
Sentences containing an explicit negative were viewed
348 msec longer than affirmative sentences (F ( 1 , 7 ) = 1 8 . 08
p<.01, MSe=1 ,289,935). This difference was 326 msec for im-
plicative verbs and 371 msec for negative-implicative verbs.
However, the C»S1 interaction was unreliable (F(1,7)=.82,
MSe=110,426).
5i<
As for factive verbs, inspection time decreased with
days, from 1810 msec on day 1 to 1507 msec on day 2 to 1469
msec on day 3 (F (2 , 1 H ) = 9 . 52
, p<.01, MSe = 938 , 565 )
.
Decision Times
.
The mean decision times for each condition, as well as
the average over verbs for each verb class, are shown in
Table 5.
Table 5 about here
The standard errors for the decision times estimated
from the error-terms of the S1»S2»V and S1»S2*V/C interac-
tions were 17 msec and 16 msec for the conditions involving
factive verbs and implicati ve/negative-implicative verbs
respectively
.
Class of factive verbs. The polarity of the complement
sentence (affirmative or negative) was highly significant
(F(1 ,7)=13.83, p<.01, MSe=126,719). However, for factive
verbs this comparison is confounded with the true-false dif-
ference: mean reaction time was 135 msec slower for nega-
tive complement sentences (the subject responded "false")
than for affirmative complement sentences (the subject
responded "true"). The true-false difference changed over
days (F(2, 1^0=6.36, p<.05, MSer32,010). The difference
dropped from 225 msec on day 1, to 73 msec on day 2 and in-
creased slightly on day 3 to 106 msec.
TABLE 5
Decision Times For Experiment IV
SI Sentence
forgot was sorry remembered was happy FACTIVES
aff neg aff neg aff neg aff neg aff nee****o
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aff 510 515 518 489 498 510
neg 647 666 685 610 593 650 621 638 637 641
remembered condescended managed happened IMPLIC.
S2
aff 529 727 493 698 509 679 486 696 504 700
neg 640 696 630 698 603 659 614 667 622 680
forgot refused declined neglected NEG-IMPL
aff 740 542 676 535 676 531 672 528
S2
neg 740 674 700 692 668 692 692 638
691 534
700 674
56
The verb factor (V) was significant (F( 3 , 21) =3 . i 9
,
P<.05, MSe=3,891). Sentences involving implicitly negative
verbs took longer than those with positive verbs: forgot
that was slower than remembered that (585 vs. 56? msec) and
was sorry that was slower than was happy that (576 vs. 558
msec). The verb factor interacted with the polarity of the
main sentence. Decisions about conditions containing im-
plicitly affirmative predicates took 36 msec longer when the
first sentence was explicitly negative than when affirma-
tive, while for implicitly negative predicates this
relationship was reversed
. (Decisions on explicitly negative
first sentences were 20 msec faster than on affirmative
ones.) (F(3,21)=2.61, p-.08, MSe=l6,866).
Class of implicative /negative
-implic ative verbs. Deci-
sions involving negative-implicative predicates took 23 msec
longer than decisions involving implicative predicates.
However, this difference was only marginally reliable
(F(1,7 = '^.25, p-.Og, MSe =2^,m8). Verbs within a class also
differed marginally from each other (F(6
,
il2) = 2. 04
,
p~.09,
MSe=13,437).
The polarity of the main sentence did not matter
(F(1 ,7)=2.83, p>.10, MSe=21,703). However, there was a
reliable C»S1 interaction (F( 1 ,7) = 2^4. 17 , p<.01, MSe = 94,629):
decisions involving implicative verbs were easier when
presented within an affirmative main sentence than within an
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explicitly negative main sentence (the difference was 127
msec), while the opposite was true for decisions involving
negative-implicative verbs (decisions on explicitly negative
main sentences were 91 msec faster than on affirmative sen-
tences). The average difference between an affirmative and
negative main sentence dropped from m7 msec on day 1, to 98
msec on day 2, to 29 msec on day 3 for negative-implicative
verbs, while for implicative verbs the difference between
negative and affirmative main sentence increased on day 2
from 109 msec to 171 msec and was about the same on day 3 as
on day 1 (102 msec). (F(2, 1^)=4.0, p<.05, MSe=22,999).
Decisions involving negative complement sentences took
62 msec longer than their positive counterparts. However,
this difference which reflects the encoding time of a nega-
tive complement sentence and is not confounded by the true-
false difference was only marginally reliable (F( 1 ,7)=5. 12,
p-.06, MSe = U3,229).
The true-false difference is reflected in the S1»S2»C
triple-interaction (F( 1 ,7)=9.52, p<.05, MSe=87,207). True
decisions were 138 msec faster than false decisions for im-
plicative verbs and 131 msec faster for negative-implicative
verbs. The true-false difference changed over days,
resulting in a reliable M-way interaction (F(2, 14)rH.66,
p<.05, MSe=6,73^). This interaction was due to the fact
that the true-false difference was larger on day 1 for im-
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plicative verbs (by 57 .sec), while on day 2 and 3 the true-
false difference was bigger for the negative-impl icati ve
verbs by 29 and 21 msec respectively.
Decision Errors
.
The overall error rate was 3.2X. It amounted to 1.9%
for sentences involving factive verbs. 3.2% for those with
implicative verbs, and ij.5% for those with negative-
implicative verbs. Error-rates were higher for conditions
involving negative complement sentences for all three verb
classes (2.6 vs. 1.2% for factives, 4.0 vs. 2.5% for im-
plicatives and 5.7 vs. 3.4? for negative-implicatives)
. For
factive and implicative predicates, explicitly negative main
sentences had a higher error rate than affirmative sen-
tences, 2.2 vs. 1.7% and 5.2 vs. 1.2% respectively, while
for negative-implicative predicates, explicitly negative
sentences had a lower error rate than affirmative sentences
(3.5 vs. 5.6%).
Discussion
As with Experiment I, I will first assume that the sub-
ject has extracted the correct implication and has it
available for comparison purposes. After showing that this
is insufficient to explain the data I will consider again
the situation under additional response bias. Also, I will
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consider an alternative model and finally propose a model
Which is able to account for the main results of Experiment
IV by assuming that the subject operates on the encoded
representation of the main sentence.
Direct Represenjtation Model
.
The direct representation model assumes that the sub-
ject encodes the presupposition of the first sentence as al-
ways trueChe paid his tax) and the implication as either
true(he paid his tax) or falseChe paid his tax) depending on
Whether the first sentence represented an affirmative or
negative implication. As a second step he encodes the probe
sentence He paid his tax as tru^(he paid his tax) and He
didn't pay his tax as falseChe p^id his tax). Furthermore,
it is assumed that encoding the negative probe sentence
takes additional time N. During the comparison stage the
subject compares the embedding strings of the encoded
presupposition or implication with the embedding string of
the encoded probe sentence. If a mismatch occurs a truth
index (originally set at "true") is set to "false" and the
value of the truth index is then executed during the
response stage. A flowchart representing this model is
given in Figure ^.
Figure ^ about here
ENCODE
PROBE SENTENCE COMPARISON STAGE RESPONSE STAGE
CHANGE
TRUTH
INDEX
RT« K^-(N) + (0)
FIGURE 4 THE DIRECT REPRESENTATION MODEL, EXPERIMENT 12
TRUTH INDEX SET ORIGINALLY TO "TRUE"
GO
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For sentences involving implicative as well as
negative-implicative predicates the model predicts, since
the embedded strings always match. that false-af firmati ves
(FA) should take longer than either false-negatives (FN) or
true-negatives (TN). Furthermore, the increase in decision
time with respect to the N and 0 parameters should be addi-
tive (FA=FN+TN.TA). The predictions the model makes are
outlined in Table 6, Model lA.
Table 6 about here
The model clearly fails: FA decisions on sentences con-
taining implicative predicates as well as negative-
implicative predicates were actually faster than the cor-
responding FN or TN conditions. The major shortcoming of
the model is its inability to predict the obtained C»S1 in-
teraction. For comparison purposes, the model nevertheless
was fitted to the data. The resulting RMSD was large
(RMSD=56.2 msec) and the value of requite low (r^=.36).
Alternative Model .
Logically it seems possible that the subject not only
derives the implication of the first sentence but in addi-
tion also sets his truth index to either "true" or "false",
depending on whether the implication was affirmative or
negative. Then in order to arrive at the correct answer all
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that is logically necessary is to encode the probe sentence
and Change the truth index to the opposite if the second
sentence was negated. However, as in Experiment I, there is
no. evidence that such a process exists. A flowchart
outlining this model is given in Figure 5
Figure 5 about here
and the derived predictions are shown in Table 6, Model IB.
Response Bias Model.
However, before discarding the direct representation
model. I will again introduce additional response bias into
the model, analogous to Experiment I. The direct represen-
tation model fails mainly because it underpredicts mean
reaction times for the FA and TN conditions. Those are both
conditions where the subject is required to make a response
which is inconsistent with the polarity of the probe sen-
tence. He has either to answer "false", when the polarity of
the probe sentence is affirmative, or "true" when it is
negative. Therefore, by assuming that in the response stage
additional response bias is operating, it seems possible to
save the direct representation model. The assumption is made
that if the response to be made (yes-no) is consistent with
the value of the probe sentence (affirmative-negative) it is
much easier for the subject to execute his response, then
TRUTH INDEX SET
TO VALUE OF
IMPLICATKDN
EXECUTE
'truth index
CHANGE
TRUTH INDEX
FIGURE 5 AN ALTERNATIVE MODEL. EXPERIMENT W
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when not. This adds an inconsistency parameter I to the
direct representation model for the FA and TN conditions.
The response bias model is outlined in Figure 6
Figure 6 about here
and the predictions it makes are shown in Table 6, Model IC.
The model which requires only H parameters for the 12
data points provides overall a good fit (RMSD=1Z1.2 msec, r^ =
.95). However, several aspects of the response bias model
are unsatisfactory. The assumption of a truth index which
is initially set to "true" is equivalent to introducing
response bias into the model. It seems therefore somewhat
excessive to postulate additional response bias for only a
few conditions. Although the value of I was positive in Ex-
periment II and III, other aspects make these experiments
suspect. For example, while in Experiment IV decisions on
negative second sentences were on the average 62 msec slower
than decisions on affirmative sentences (for implicative and
negative-implicative predicates), this relationship was
reversed in Experiment II and III (difference 20 msec in the
opposite direction).
The most serious challenge to the response bias model,
however, comes from results of the analysis of variance.
The analysis for factive predicates showed that the verb
factor was significant, while the analysis for implicative
ENCODE
PROBE SENTENCE
RESPONSE STAGE
RT -= K + (N) -I- (0) (I)
FIGURE 6 THE RESPONSE BIAS MODEL. EXPERIMENT 12,^
MODEL IC. TRUTH INDEX SET ORIGINALLY TO TRUE
M
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and negative-implicative predicates showed „,arginal sig-
nificance for the two verb classes. Since the direct
representation model clearly predicts that decision ti.e
Should not depend on the original for. of the first sen-
tence, a further analysis of variance was performed with
subjects (S), class of verbs (C; factive, implicative and
negatlve-implicative predicates) and verbs within a class
(V/C) as factors. m order to be able to generalize over
both subjects and predicates, S and V/C were regarded as
random effect variables, C a fixed effect variable. The
results, contradictory to all models assuming a direct
representation of the Implication or presupposition, showed
Significant effects of both the C factor (Quasi
F(2,27)=8.«3, p<.01, MSe=6,16H) and the V/C factor
(F(9,63)=2.19, p<.05, MSe=855).
One aspect of the data that the direct representation
model was unable to account for was the finding that deci-
sions on Implicitly affirmative factive predicates (remem-
bered that, was happy that) differed from those on im-
plicitly negative ones ( forgot that, was sorry that ). A
model which takes these differences Into account will be
proposed next.
68
The Computation model
.
The model is outlined in Figure 7. It assumes that the
subject encodes the second sentence, taking additional
Figure 7 about here
time N for negative second sentences. He then goes through
a series of operations on his internal representation of the
first sentence before executing his response. In a first
step, the number of negation markers (both explicit and im-
plicit) is evaluated. If the result is greater than one,
they are combined to an affirmative value, taking additional
timeo(. Then the sentence is checked for the remaining
negation marker, if present. For sentences containing a
that-complementizer the negation marker is dropped (adding
time_^), while for sentences with a to-complementizer the
subject changes the value of the complement sentence in the
presence of a negation marker (adding time S). Then in a
last step, the polarity of the probe sentence (S2) is com-
pared to the polarity of the complement. If the two match,
the subject responds "true", if not he responds "false".
The predictions this model makes are shown in Table 7,
Table 7 about here
together with the observed and predicted reaction times for
each condition. (The conditions for factive predicates are
RESPOND "true" RESPOND ''FALSE"
RGURE 7 THE COMPUTATION MODEL
e3
ITABLE 7
Model, Data and Predictions For Experiments IV and V
SI • S2
EXP IV FA'P V
DI MODEL 0 P D p D
F+ A TA RT=K1 481 475 6 16
F- A TA RT=KH-|3 516 520 -4 694
-10
F+ N FA RT=K1+N+F 607 607 0 813 829 -16
F- N FA RT=Kl+p +N+F 644 652 -8 905 895 10
F+ A TA RT=K1+ P 514 520 -6 713 704 9
F- A TA RT=K1+ 503 509 -6 656 679 -23
F+ N FA RT=K1+P +N+F 666 652 14 882 895 -13
F- N FA RT=Kl+cK +N+F 638 641 -3 892 870 22
1+ A TA RT=K2 504 501 3 657 631 26
.1- A FN RT=K2+S+F 700 696 4 942 940 2
1+ N FA RT=K2+N+F 622 633 -11 795 822 -27
I- N TN RT=K2+N+S 680 690 -10 946 945 1
NI+ A FN RT=K2+S+F 691 696 -5 935 940 5
NI- A TA RT=K2+ «. 534 535 -1 652 bl2 -20
NI+ N TN RT=K2+N+S 700 690 10 943 945 -2
NI- N FA RT=K2+ +N+F 674 667 7 884 863 -21
Experiment IV: Kl = A75 K2 = 501 34 45
N = 63 F = 69 S = 126
RMSD =7.1 r2= .986
Experiment V: Kl = 638 K2 = 631 cK =41 P = 66
N = 98 F = 93 S = 216
RMSD =16.3 r2= .967
I
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separated into those which are implicitly affirmative and
those Which are implicitly negative.) The model requiring 7
parameters for the 16 data points fits extremely well. The
HMSD is 7.1 msec, with the highest deviation of observed vs.
predicted reaction time in any condition of only „,sec.
This is within the error estimated from the original
analysis. The computed r^ was .986.
The last experiment queried the subject only about the
implication or presupposition of an earlier presented sen-
tence. Although this would seem to make it advantageous to
the subject to figure out the implication or presupposition
in advance, he does not do so. Perhaps what is needed is a
more full and deep comprehension of the first sentence, of
the kind you might get when a person forms a visual image of
an object or an event. The next experiment was designed to
test this notion and see if by changing the instructions to
the subject, results could be obtained which were more in
accordance with the direct representation model.
EXPERIMENT V
Method
.
Subjects. 2n students, none of whom participated in
the earlier experiments, served as paid subjects for 2 daily
sessions
.
Design and Procedure. Experiment V differed from Ex-
periment IV in that it required the subject to form an image
of the event expressed in the first sentence, instead of
just reading and comprehending it. In order to make the
image formation somewhat easier, the noun phrase He was
replaced with four different noun phrases: The judge, the
slave, the clerk and the pupil
. In addition the complement
sentences were changed to: spanked the child, ate his din-
ner, cut his hair and signed the paper
. The predicates used
were the same as in Experiment I and IV.
As in the last experiment, the subject, after finishing
processing the first sentence, pressed a button (the inspec-
tion time was recorded) which removed the main sentence from
the screen and displayed the probe sentence.
Results
Inspection Times .
The mean inspection times for each condition are shown
in Table 8.
72
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Table 8 about here
Cl^ss of factive verbs. As in the last experiment ex-
.
plicitly negative main sentences were processed longer (172
msec) than affirmative ones. (F( 1 ,23)=12.79, p<.01,
MSe
=
Mil8,072). This difference differed for the different
predicates. It was 186 msec and -24 msec for the predicates
forgot that and was sorry that respectively, while it was
Ml
2 msec for happy that and 116 msec for remembered
that
.
Class of implicative / negative
-implicative verbs. Sen-
tences containing negati ve-impl icati ve predicates were, as
in Experiment IV, studied longer (150 msec) than sentences
with implicative predicates (F( 1 , 23 ) = 1 3 . 93 , p<.01,
MSe=6l6,376).
As before, explicitly negative sentences were viewed
200 msec longer than affirmative sentences (F( 1
,
23 ) = ^1 . 69
,
p<.05, MSe=3267, 187)
.
Again this difference was somewhat
larger (although unreliable) for negati ve-implicative
predicates (212 msec) than for implicative predicates (188
msec )
.
Decision T imes .
The mean decision times for each condition, as well as
the average over verbs for each verb class are shown in
Table 9.
TABLE 8
Mean Inspection Times For Experiment V
SI Sentence
forgot was sorry remembered was happy FACTIVES
aff neg aff neg aff neg aff neg aff neg
2209 2395 2270 2246 2220 2336 2004 2416 2176 2348
remembered condescended managed happened IMPLIC.
2009 2197 2078 2197 1980 2250 1958 2131 2006 2194
forgot refused declined neglected
2234 2236 2024 2362 2167 2411 2149 2414
NEG-IMPL.
2144 2356
74-
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Table 9 about here
The standard error for the decision ti^es. estimated as
before, was somewhat larger than in the last experiment. It
amounted to 22 .sec for both the factive and the
implicative/negative-implicative verb class.
Class of factive verbs. "True" decisions were 194 msec
faster than "false" decisions (F( 1 ,23)=58.8, p<.01,
MSe=122,535). This difference is again confounded with the
presence or absence of a negation marker in the second sen-
tence. If the first sentence was negative, decisions took
an average of 21 msec longer than when affirmative
(F( 1 ,23) = 3.8, p-'.07, MSe = 22,223).
As in Experiment IV and contradictory to predictions
from the direct representation model, the verb factor was
significant (F( 3 , 69 ) =3 . 2 , p<.05, MSe=26 , 494 ) . Furthermore,
the pattern of reaction times to the different factive
predicates was the same as in the last experiment: decisions
on sentences containing implicitly negative predicates took
longer than those on implicitly affirmative predicates (for-
got that vs. remember that = 12 msec, was sorry that vs.
i^il ^aPPy that = 28 msec). And as in the last experiment,
this factor interacted (this time highly reliably) with the
polarity of the first sentence: decisions on explicitly
negative first sentences were an average of 66 msec slower
Iforgot
TABLE 9
Decision Times For Experiment V
SI Sentence
was sorry remembered was happy
aff neg aff neg
S2
aff 729 653 697 658 669 683
neg 885 920 879 863 832 956
aff neg aff neg
639 704
793 854
FACTIVES
aff neg
684 674
847 898
remembered condescended managed happened
S2
aff
S2
neg
646 956
802 970
665 973
813 941
654 887
786 960
662 943
778 915
forgot refused declined neglected
aff 935 673 957 644 945 659 901 631
neg 989 903 933 867 900 885 949 882
IMPLIC.
657 942
795 946
NEG-IMPL
.
935 652
943 884
76
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for implicitly affirmative predicates, while 25 msec faster
for implicitly negative predicates (F(3,69)=5. p<.01,
MSe=25,429).
• ^ implj^atij^/nega^ verbs. Deci-
sions involving negative-implicative predicates took 18 msec
longer than those on implicative predicates. As in the last
experiment. this difference was, however, only marginally
reliable (F( 1 ,23) = 3.53, p<.08, MSe = 36,iim). Decisions on
the different verbs within a class did not differ from each
other (F(6,138)=1.M6, p>.io, MSe=26,970).
As in the last experiment, there was no SI main effect
(F(1,23)
= 2.U7, p>.10, MSe = 88,i<39) but a highly reliable S1»C
interaction (F( 1 , 23)-- 1 03
.
85 , MSe= 1 39 , 957) . Again decisions
on implicative predicates were easier when they occurred
together with an affirmative main sentence (218 msec), while
decisions on negative implicative predicates were easier
with negative main sentences (171 msec). The advantage of
implicative predicates with an affirmative main sentence
over a negative one dropped more from day 1 to day 2 (from
269 msec to 168 msec) than the advantage of negative-
implicative predicates with a negative main sentence (from
187 msec to 15^ msec) (F( 1 , 23 ) =8 . 50
, p<.01, MSe=^9,799).
"True" decisions were 89 msec faster than "false" deci-
sions (F(1 ,23) = 11 .97, p<.01, MSe = 256,i<66). This difference
was 69 msec for implicative predicates and 112 msec for
negative-implicative predicates.
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Decisions on negative second sentences took 96 msec
longer than on affirmative ones (F( 1 ,23)=^7.^6, p<.01,
MSe=47,166), reflecting the extra reading and encoding time
of
.negative complement sentences. This difference was
larger for decisions involving negative-implicative
predicates (121 msec) than implicative predicates (72 msec).
(F(1,23)=8.89. p<.01, MSe=22,045). However, this pattern
occurred only on day 1, while on day 2 this difference was
about the same for both verb classes (D»C»S2 interaction:
F(l ,23) = 10.29, p<.01, r^Se=17,500).
Departing from the last experiment, there was a
reliable S1»S2 interaction (F( 1 , 23)=8 . 89
,
p<.01,
MSe = 22,0il5). While it did not matter for positive probe
sentences whether the main sentence was explicitly affirma-
tive or negative, for negative second sentences it did.
Decisions were i*6 msec faster if the main sentence was af-
firmative than when negative.
All in all, the results look very similar to the ones
obtained in the last experiment. The analysis of variance
showed again factors to be significant (e.g. the V main ef-
fect and the S1*V interaction for factive predicates as well
as the S1»C interaction for implicative/negative- implica-
tive predicates) that cannot be explained by the direct
representation model, but are easily handled by the computa-
tion model. The computation model was fitted to the new set
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of data (least square criterion) and the observed and
predicted values are shown in Table 7, Experiment V. The
fit is good. The computed r^ is .97 and RMSD is 16.3 msec
with the largest deviation in any one condition being 27
msec
,
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
The question was asked whether a person can or cannot
extract and store the implication and presupposition of sen-
tences together with the representations of entire sen-
tences. The results of the first three experiments showed
the difficulties models have which assume that a person uses
the decomposed form of a sentence in order to answer a ques-
tion about the implication or presupposition. Yet a rela-
tive simple computation model which assumes that the subject
operates on the original matrix sentence could account for
most of the data of Experiment I and was at least sugges-
tive. Therefore, a new paradigm was introduced which
separated the stage of comprehending the implication and
presupposition of a sentence from the decision stage. In
addition, the data analysis was performed such that it in-
cluded factors pertaining to the input stage which under the
assumption of direct representation of implication and
presupposition, should no longer influence the decision
stage.
Experiment IV gave strong evidence that subjects derive
the implications or presuppositions of a sentence at the
time they are asked to answer a question about them and not
at the time of original comprehension. When measuring reac-
tion time to the probe sentence it was found that decision
81
time was influenced by the class of predicates (factive, im-
plicative, negative-implicative), by the different
predicates within a class and by whether the first sentence
was explicitly negated or not. None of these factors should
have had an effect on reaction time of the second sentence.
A model was developed which assumes that the subject at
the time he is asked to answer a question computes the value
of the implication or presupposition (affirmative or nega-
tive) from the representation of the full sentence. He the
arrives at the correct decision by comparing the value of
the computed implication or presupposition to the value of
the probe sentence. The developed model did fit the data ex-
tremely well.
In order to be able to generalize to a less specific
situation the experiement was repeated under imaginal in-
structions. Although the overall reaction times were
somewhat slower, the same pattern for the different condi-
tions emerged as before and again a good fit was obtained by
employing the computation model and using the same
parameters as before.
It is still possible that the obtained results are
specific to the employed experimental situation, that sub-
jects developed special strategies to deal with the task.
Two aspects argue against this notion: first, subjects were
tested for three days (Experiment IV) on the implication or
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presupposition only, they were only rewarded for fast and
accurate decision times, but no pay-off systems were in-
volved with respect to the inspection times. Therefore it
would have been to the subject's advantage to have the
simplest possible representation available for comparison
purposes. Models considering those type of representations
could clearly be rejected. Second, the results of Experi-
ment V, which were obtained under imaginal instructions were
so similar to those of Experiment IV, that one is tempted to
assume that the same underlying representations and the same
control processes were used in both cases.
Not much can be said about the form of the underlying
representation of the main sentence. But again, the
similarity in results of Experiment IV and V, as well as the
differences in inspection time for different sentence forms,
verbs and verb classes at least suggests that subjects are
not just operating on the stored surface form of the main
sentence, but on a somewhat more abstract representation of
the original (not decomposed) sentence.
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